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Abstract: 
 
Starting from an econometric model which performed well in explaining medal wins in the 
previous Summer Olympics and predicting the medal distribution across nations at the Beijing 
Olympics, an adapted model is built up to achieve the same job for the Winter Games. When 
estimating the model for Winter Olympics the variables that determine the distribution of 
medal wins are: the level of economic development (GDP per inhabitant), population, a host 
country advantage, the political regime, the number of winter sports resorts and, to a lesser 
extent, the annual level of snow coverage. With this estimated model, the prediction of medal 
wins at the 2014 Sochi Games forecasts the biggest number of medals to be won by the U.S. 
team followed by Germany, Canada and Russia. Of course, such prediction may always 
reveal to be partly wrong due to possible sporting surprises which might emerge during the 
actual 2014 Games. 
 
 
 
 
 
Soon after Russia has got the organisation of Winter Games in Sochi in 2014, official 
expectation, namely mentioned by President Vladimir Putin, has become that Russia will win 
the Games she is going to host. A same feeling has been reinforced by a high Olympic 
performance of China at Beijing Summer Games in 2008 since the host country has won the 
greatest number of gold medals and the second overall number of medals, compared to all 
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other participating countries. Thus, it is legitimate to raise the question: is hosting the Games 
enough to win? 
To the best of our knowledge nobody has attempted to elaborate on an economic model for 
predicting medal wins at Winter Olympics so far as it is confirmed by Forrest et al. (2012). 
This contrasts with Summer Olympics for which about thirty studies have estimated economic 
determinants of sporting performances. Namely, it has been empirically verified that the 
number of medals a country can make at Summer Olympics significantly depends on its 
population and GDP per inhabitant (Andreff, 2001). In the past decade, a number of papers 
have started providing economic predictions of medal distribution per country at next 
Olympic Games (Bernard, 2008; Bernard & Busse, 2004; Hawksworth, 2008; Johnson & Ali, 
2004; Johnson & Ali, 2008; Maennig & Wellebrock, 2008; Wang & Jiang, 2008). Our own 
model has exactly predicted 70%, and correctly (with a small error margin), 88% of medal 
wins totals per nation at the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Andreff et al., 2008; Andreff, 2010). 
Although the dependent variable is the same – the number of medals won by each 
participating nation -, some independent variables have to be kept for Winter Games whereas 
some new variables must be introduced to capture the specificity of Winter Olympic sports. 
Thus, we would take stake of the good predictions achieved with our model for Summer 
Olympics to adapt it in view of forecasting the distribution of medal wins per nation at the 
2014 Sochi Winter Games.  
We start with briefly reminding the most interesting methodologies at work in estimating 
Summer Olympics medal distribution (1). Then we show how our own model has resolved the 
issue (2). The model has been used to predict medals totals per nation at the 2008 Olympics 
and prediction is compared to actual outcomes of different nations in Beijing, a comparison 
which is absolutely rare in the literature so far (3). A brief discussion provides justification for 
keeping some similar variables in a model attempting to estimate the determinants of medals 
distribution at Winter Olympics and to introduce some new variables that fit better with 
explaining winter sports performance; the discussion comes out with a somewhat different 
model (4). The latter is estimated with data about Winter Olympic Games from 1964 up to 
2010 (5). The estimated model is then used to predict the medal distribution across 
participating nations at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics with a focus on the performance of 
host country (Russia) and CIS and Central and Eastern European countries – CEECs (6). A 
conclusion reminds the reader that all such predictions are to be taken with a pinch of salt (7). 
 
1. Economic determinants of Olympic medals 
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A widespread assumption across sports economists is that a nation‟s Olympic performance 
must be determined by its endowment in economic and human resources and development of 
these resources. Thus, the starting point of most studies about economic determinants of 
Olympic medals consists in regressing a nation‟s medal wins total on its level of GDP per 
capita and population. Note that growth in medal wins by one country logically is an 
equivalent decrease in medals won by all other nations participating to the Olympics. 
Therefore, if one wants to understand the Olympic performance of one specific nation, 
account is to be taken of all other participating nations within the overall constraint of the 
allocated medals total during this year‟s Olympics.  
In the first papers about economic determinants of Olympic performance, such as GDP per 
capita and population, these variables were combined with weather, nutrition, and mortality in 
the athlete‟s home nation. Later on, in various studies up to the 1970s, other variables had 
been considered as possible determinants of Olympic medal wins: protein consumption, 
religion, colonial past, newspapers supply, urban population, life expectancy, geographical 
surface area, military expenditures, judicial system and those sport disciplines taught at 
school. However, with the cold war period, another very significant variable emerged: a 
nation‟s political regime. The first Western work attempting to explain medal wins by the 
political regime of nations (Ball, 1972) immediately triggered a Soviet rejoinder (Novikov & 
Maximenko, 1972), both differentiating capitalist and communist regimes. The first two 
econometric analyses of Olympic Games (Grimes et al., 1974; Levine, 1974) exhibited that 
communist countries were outliers in regressing medal wins on GDP per capita and 
population: they were winning more medals than their level of economic development and 
population were likely to predict. A last variable has been introduced, namely since Clarke 
(2000), which is the influence on medal wins of being the Olympics hosting country. The host 
gains more medals than otherwise due to big crowds of national fans, a stronger national 
athletes‟ motivation when competing on their home ground and being adapted to local 
weather, and not tired by a long pre-Games travel. 
More sophisticated econometric methodology has been used in recent articles that predicted 
Olympic medal wins, such as an ordered Logit model (Andreff, 2001), a Probit model (Nevill 
et al., 2002) or an ordered Probit model (Johnson and Ali, 2004). The most often quoted 
reference is Bernard and Busse (2004) whose Tobit model has been assessed as the most 
performing one and then used by Jiang and Xu (2005), Pfau (2006) and others. Bernard and 
Busse‟s model is considered as the best achieved economic model for estimating and 
 4 
predicting Olympic performance
2
, in which two major independent variables do explain the 
great bulk of medal distribution across participating countries: GDP per capita and population. 
Three dummy variables capture a host country effect, the influence of belonging to Soviet-
type and other communist (and post-Soviet and post-communist after 1990) countries as 
against being a non communist market economy. Such dummies are supposed to capture the 
impact of political regime on medal wins.  
 
2. Countries’ sport performances at Summer Olympics: estimation of their determinants 
 
Starting from Bernard and Busse, we have elaborated on a more specified model (Andreff et 
al., 2008) with a few improving emendations. The dependent variable is the number of medal 
wins
3
 by each nation: Mi,t. Our first two explanatory variables are GDP per inhabitant in 
purchasing power parity dollars (PPP $) and population. Both variables are four-year lagged 
(t-4) under the assumption that four years are required to build up, train, prepare and make an 
Olympic team the most competitive in due time, four years later. That is, for explaining medal 
wins in 2008, we take 2004 GDP per capita and population as estimators. A Host dummy 
variable is used to capture a host country effect, i.e. the observed surplus of medals usually 
won by the national squad of hosting nation.  
Our first emendation to Bernard and Busse‟s model regards the political regime variable: 
Bernard and Busse rather crudely divide the world into communist regimes and capitalist 
market economies which obviously fits with the cold war period. Since then, this is too crude 
when it comes to so-called post-communist transition economies (Andreff, 2004 & 2007) in 
particular with regards to the sports economy sector which has differentiated a lot across 
former socialist countries during their institutional transformation process (Poupaux and 
Andreff, 2007). Such differentiation has translated into a scattered efficiency in winning 
Olympic medals after 1991 (Rathke & Woitek, 2008).  
Our classification distinguishes first Central Eastern European countries (CEEC) which gave 
up a Soviet-type centrally planned economy in 1989 or 1990, and transformed into a 
democratic political regime running a market economy: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia (and Czechoslovakia until 
the 1993 split), Slovenia, and the GDR (until German reunification in 1990). Another 
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commonality to this group is that these countries have all joined the European Union in 2004 
or 2007. A second country group (TRANS) gathers new independent states (former Soviet 
republics) and some former CMEA member states which have started up a transition similar 
to the one in CEECs but are lagging behind in terms of transformation into a democratic 
regime and some are stalling on the path toward a market economy: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. None of them has joined the EU so far or 
has really an option to do so. The two next groups have not been Soviet regimes properly 
speaking in the past, although they have been both communist regimes and planned 
economies. In the first one (NSCOM), we sample those countries which have started up a 
transition process in the 1990s: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Laos, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (and the former FSR Yugoslavia before the 1991 
breakup). Two countries have not yet engaged into a democratic transformation and a market 
economy: Cuba and North Korea, and must be considered as still communist regimes (COM). 
All other countries are regarded as capitalist market economies (CAPME), the reference group 
in our estimations.  
Then we have introduced a last variable that captures the influence on Olympic performance 
of a specific sporting culture in a region. For example, Afghan ladies are not used to have 
much sport participation or to attend sport shows, even less to be enrolled in the Olympic 
team. As a result of these cultural (sometimes institutional) disparities, some nations are more 
specialised in one specific sport discipline such as weight-lifting in Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Armenia, marathon and long distance runs in Ethiopia and Kenya, cycling in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, table tennis, judo and martial arts in Asia, sprint in Caribbean islands and the 
U.S., etc. It is not easy to design a variable that would exactly capture such regional sporting 
culture differences
4
, but we have considered that regional dummies may reflect them. For 
model estimation, we divide the world into nine “sporting culture” regions: AFS, sub-Sahara 
African countries; AFN: North African countries; NAM, North American countries; LSA, 
Latin and South American countries; EAST, Eastern European countries; WEU, Western 
European countries (taken as the reference region in our estimations); OCE, Oceania 
countries; MNE, Middle East countries; and ASI, (other) Asian countries. 
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Our first model is simply a specification à la Bernard and Busse, but with a differently 
defined political regime variable. Our estimation is based on a censored Tobit model since a 
non negligible number of countries that participate to the Olympics do not win any medal. 
Therefore, a zero value of the Mi,t dependent variable does not mean that a country has not 
participated and we work out a simple Tobit, not a Tobit 2 (with a two stage Heckman 
procedure). Contrary to Bernard and Busse, we do not assume that preparing an Olympic 
team is timeless and, then, independent variables are four-year lagged behind the dependent 
variable. Thus, GDP per inhabitant is noted (Y/N)i,t-4 , measured in 1995 PPP dollars, and  Ni,t-4  
stands for population. Dummies are introduced to test whether the Olympics year is 
significant, taking 2004 as reference. These dummies come out to be non significant. In a 
second model, we adopt a data panel Tobit to take into account unobserved heterogeneity, 
whose test is significant
5
, and then we opt for an estimation with random effects. Our data
6
 
encompass all Summer Olympics from 1976 to 2004, except 1980 and 1984 which are 
skipped out due to boycotts which have distorted the medal distribution per country. Our first 
specification (1) is:  
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Our second specification (2) is an emended variant of Bernard and Busse model, including 
our more specific political regime variable, but also above-described dummies standing for 
regions of sporting culture (Regionr,i): 
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 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is significant (Pr = 0.00).  
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 Our data panel is not balanced since the number of existing countries in the world has increased between 1976 
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In a third specification (3), the one used for prediction, we have introduced an additional 
variable Mi,t-4 on the right-hand side of model (2), just like Bernard and Busse who do not 
comment why they proceed in such a way. Our idea is that winning medals at the previous 
Olympics matters for an Olympic national team which usually expects and attempts to 
achieve at least as well as four years ago. Such inertial effect is all the more relevant for a 
nation eager to win as many medals as possible from one Olympiad to the other (a national 
„Olympics cult‟7) and mobilise a lot of resources to succeed in. The resulting inertia 
differentiates those nations pulled by Olympics cult from those nations which are used to win 
zero or few medals. These two groups must be distinguished with using Mi,t-4 otherwise the 
prediction will be distorted.  
 
Table 1 – Tobit estimation of medal wins at Summer Olympics 
Independent variables Tobit Model 1 Tobit (panel) Model 
2 
 Tobit Model 3                
with lagged M 
Log population (t-4)          9,14***    4,15***      2,15***     
Log GDP per capita (t-4)      12,42***  5,44***  2,73***      
Host  24,37***    10,40***   10,04***    
Political Regime (ref. CAPME)    
COM                    24,34***   11,18***      5,76**     
TRANS                  23,24***   20,97***      8,15***    
CEEC                   21,43***   17,94***      6,71**     
NSCOM                  11,98***   8,06***       5,22*     
Region (ref. WEU)             
AFN                     -4,45* -1,81 
AFS                     3,67* 0,75 
NAM                      7,93*** 0,076 
LSA                     0,57 -1,08 
ASI                     -4,34***    -2,58*      
EAST                    -5,53*  -3,5 
MNE                     -5,00***    -2,47*      
OCE                     6,277**   1,3 
Year dummy  (ref. 2004)      
1976 4,63                             
1988 -0,2                             
1992 3,33                             
1996 3,35                             
2000 0,31                             
Medals (t-4)                                                0,95***    
Constant                       -138***   '-51,30***  -31,57***      
Number of observations        941 941 831 
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Log-likelihood value          -1646,1 -1551,5 -1224,2 
Pseudo R2              0,17 0,19 0,34 
*** Significant at 1% threshold; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
Source: Andreff et al., 2008. 
 
All our estimations deliver significant results (Table 1). In the first estimation, all coefficients 
are positive and significant at a 1% threshold, except for year dummies. Thus, it is once again 
confirmed that medal wins are determined by GDP per capita, population and a host country 
effect. Political regime is also an explanatory variable, in particular in the case of communist 
and post-communist transition countries. Our second estimation (Tobit/panel) all in all 
exhibits the same results. The coefficients of regional sporting culture are significant except 
for Latin America, an area in which the North American sporting culture may have permeated 
namely through Caribbean countries and Mexico (classified in NAM).  
Since Western Europe is the reference a significant coefficient with a positive sign means that 
a region performs relatively better than Western Europe in terms of Olympic medals (a 
negative sign means a lower relative performance than Western Europe). Sub-Sahara Africa, 
North America and Oceania perform better. It is a little bit surprising for Sub-Sahara African 
countries since they are among the least developed countries in the world (except South 
Africa), but such effect is due to a few African countries which are extremely specialised in 
one sport discipline where they are capable to win a non negligible number of medals, such as 
Ethiopia and Kenya in long distance runs. With negative coefficients, North Africa, Asia, 
Eastern Europe and Middle East show a lower relative performance than Western Europe. It is 
not surprising for North Africa and the Middle East due to some restrictions to sporting 
culture in various countries. In the case of Asia, only few countries are capable to win a 
significant number of medals (China, both Koreas, Mongolia) given their GDP per capita. A 
surprise is a negative coefficient for Eastern European countries which are known as outliers 
or over-performers (given their GDP per capita and population). In fact, the negative 
coefficient results from Political Regime variable which already captures their over-
performance.  
 
3. Predicting medal wins at Beijing Olympics: comparison with observed outcomes 
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Then, our model (3) is used to predict medal distribution at the 2008 Beijing Olympics: 
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Since we use here a pooling estimation
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 of Model 3, it may suffer from an endogeneity bias 
and the results may be biased by a correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and 
the error term. We have treated this issue with a dynamic panel GMM (Arellano & Bond, 
1991). This technique provides estimated coefficients and predictions that are robust and close 
to those estimated with a Tobit model. Our predictions are published (Andreff et al., 2008) 
only for a sub-sample of countries gathered in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Prediction of medal wins at Beijing Olympics 
 
  
Medals won in 
2004 
Médial wins 
predicted in 2008 
Lower bound Upper bound 
CEEC:      
Bulgaria 12 12 10 13 
Hungary 17 19 17 21 
Poland 10 14 12 16 
Czech Republic 8 10 8 12 
Romania 19 21 19 23 
TRANS:      
Belarus 15 17 14 20 
Kazakhstan 8 11 8 14 
Russia 92 96 93 100 
Ukraine 23 27 24 29 
NSCOM      
China 63 80 73 86 
Cuba 27 29 25 33 
CAPME:      
Germany 49 52 50 54 
Australia 49 51 47 54 
Canada 12 15 13 18 
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choose a pooling estimation.  
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United States 102 106 103 110 
France 33 36 35 38 
Great Britain 30 47 32 35 
Italy 32 35 34 36 
Less developed countries      
Brazil 10 12 10 14 
South Korea 30 30 27 32 
Kenya 7 2 1 4 
Jamaica 5 11 0 4 
Turkey 10 9 7 11 
Source: Andreff et al., 2008.  
 
The first-ranked predicted winner is, as usual, the U.S., followed by Russia and China, which 
benefits from a host country effect. Most developed and democratic market economies 
(CAPME) are predicted to be among the major medal winners together with some pot-
communist transition countries. Our forecast for France was between 35 and 38 medals while 
the State Secretary for Sports was hoping that the national team would reach 40.  
The publication of our article in French (Andreff et al., 2008) one month before the opening 
of Beijing Olympics rapidly became a hit in different French and European media and TV 
channels. First interviews asked to focus on our prediction. In a second wave, after the Games 
end, all interviewers became eager to know for which countries the model had provided 
correct or wrong prediction and, in the latter case, why were it so. This triggered the writing 
of a follow up companion paper requested by the French National Institute for Sport and 
Physical Education (INSEP) to be included in its volume devoted to the overall outcome of 
Beijing Olympics for France (Andreff, 2009).  
Our model provided good predictions regarding those 189 countries for which data were 
available and computable: 70% of the observed results belong to our predicted confidence 
interval. If one assesses our model prediction as acceptable when its error margin is not bigger 
than a two-medal difference between prevision and reality, then it correctly predicts 88% of 
all Beijing results. The remaining unexplained 12% (23 nations) account for sporting 
“surprises” – unexpected results. The model correctly predicts the first ten medal winners, 
except Japan (instead of Ukraine), misses only four out of the first twenty winners, although 
with a slightly different ranking. However, the most interesting results are witnessed when the 
model is clearly wrong in its prediction that basically happens for 23 countries, because it 
means that our five variables (plus the inertial variable) have not captured some core 
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explanation of the Olympics outcome. Fortunately, economists are not capable to predict all 
the detailed Olympics results, otherwise why still convene the Games?  
Which are the major “surprises” delivered by actual results when compared with our 
predictions? The first one is a quite bigger than expected medal wins by the Chinese team – 
all published predictions have been wrong in this respect. Our model has clearly 
underestimated the host country effect in China. Possibly, Chinese performance has also been 
boosted by some undetected doping
9
. The second surprise is the underperformance of the 
Russian Olympic team, the worst since the cold war. It was regarded so much “catastrophic” 
that Mr. Putin convened the highest decision makers of Russian sport to command a new 
Olympic policy likely to avoid a repeated disaster at the 2012 London Olympics. In the same 
vein, some other transition countries, namely Romania, have won fewer medals than expected 
in Beijing. The current state of reforming institutions and restructuring the whole sports sector 
in these countries (Poupaux and Andreff, 2007) has not been sufficiently captured in our 
model, despite our more refined political regime variable.  
The last three significant surprises are Great Britain, Jamaica and Kenya, the latter being the 
only two developing countries ranked among the first twenty medal winners. Early 
preparation of a super-competitive team for the 2012 London Olympics may have been the 
cause for higher than expected outcomes of the British team, as it is suggested by Maennig 
and Wellebrock (2008) who have introduced a “next Olympics host country” variable in their 
prediction. However, such future host country effect slightly improves the authors‟ forecast: 
38 predicted medals as against 47 won by Great Britain. Without such effect our own model 
predicted between 32 and 35 medals for Great Britain. British medals concentration in cycling 
(12 medals) may trace back again to undetected doping and/or deep specialisation of a nation 
in one sport discipline. The latter is the most likely explanation for Jamaican medals
10
 
concentrated in sprint and Kenyan medals in long distance runs. Though we have taken into 
account such specialisation through our lagged Mi,t-4 variable – Kenya had won 7 medals and 
Jamaica 5 in the same disciplines at Athens Olympics -, the inertia captured with this variable 
reveals to be insufficient.  
 
4. A model adapted to estimating the determinants of medal wins at Winter Olympics 
 
                                                 
9
 This issue is discussed in depth in Andreff et al. (2008) explaining why we had not been able to integrate 
doping among independent variables despite the fact that we wished to do so. 
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 Some Jamaican sprint finalists have been controlled positive in doping tests during the weeks after the Beijing 
Games, which may be another explanatory variable.  
 12 
The context of Winter Olympics is rather different from the one of Summer Olympics. In 
1976, 92 countries had participated to Summer Olympics with 6,084 athletes while they were 
only 37 countries participating to Winter Olympics the same year, with 1,123 athletes (Table 
3). In 2004, 201 countries were participating to Athens Olympics with 10,658 athletes 
whereas 80 countries had participated to the 2006 Winter Games in Turin with 2,651 athletes. 
From a global economic standpoint, Winter Olympics is a rather small sports mega-event 
compared to Summer Olympic Games. However, the former has grown a lot during the span 
of time covered in this paper. The number of participating countries has increased from 36 in 
1964 up to 82 in 2010 while the number of athletes has augmented from 1,091 to 2,629. The 
number of medals to be won at Winter Olympics is smaller than the one observed at Summer 
Olympic Games (over 900 overall since 2000): it has grown from 103 in 1964 up to 258 in 
2010. When it comes to the number of nations having won at least one Olympic medal, it has 
increased from 14 in 1964 to 26 in 2010 (as against a maximum of 80 countries at the 2000 
Summer Games).  
 
Table 3 - Winter Olympic performances, 1964-2010   
      
City Year Participating Countries Overall number Participating  
    countries with M > 0 of medals athletes 
Innsbruck  1964 36 14 103 1091 
Grenoble 1968 37 15 106 1171 
Sapporo  1972 35 17 105 1008 
Innsbruck  1976 37 16 111 1123 
Lake Placid 1980 37 19 115 1072 
Sarajevo 1984 48 17 117 1279 
Calgary 1988 57 17 138 1424 
Albertville 1992 63 20 171 1772 
Lillehammer 1994 67 22 183 1747 
Nagano 1998 72 24 205 2176 
Salt Lake City 2002 77 24 234 2386 
Turin 2006 80 26 252 2651 
Vancouver 2010 82 26 258 2629 
Source: IOC.      
 
Since population, GDP per inhabitant and the host country dummy variable have emerged as 
basic determinants of medal wins at Summer Olympics, we keep them in the Winter 
Olympics model. Keeping GDP per capita in the model is particularly sensible because it is 
nearly obvious from Table 4 that there is a relationship between the number of medal wins 
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and the level of economic development. In Table 4, country groups are those defined by the 
World Bank. Developed market economies (DMEs) are countries with a GDP per inhabitant 
over 10,725$ in 2006; (newly) emerging economies (NMEs) are countries whose GDP per 
inhabitant is between 3,466$ and 10,725$; intermediary income (developing) countries (IICs) 
are those with a GDP per inhabitant between 876$ and 3,465$; least developed countries 
(LDCs) are those with a GDP per inhabitant below 876$. At Winter Olympic Games, one 
witness a concentration of medal wins on DMEs whatever the number of participating DMEs. 
The average number of medal wins is always higher in the DME and NME groups than in 
IICs and LDCs. Even with a growing number of participating countries – from 4 in 1964 to 20 
in 2010 for IICs and from 3 to 13 for LDCs – these two country groups are not able to 
substantially increase their share in the medals total. In most Winter Games, LDCs have not 
won even a medal (except in 1992 and 1994 with just one medal win).  
 
Table 4 - Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by level of 
economic development  
       
Year Country Number of Mean: m Coefficient of Number of  Countries  
  group medals   variation: /m countries with M > 0 
1964 DME 77 3.67 1.27 21 12 
  NEC 26 3.25 2.71 8 2 
  IIC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 3 0 
1968 DME 83 3,95 1.13 21 11 
  NEC 23 2,56 1.70 9 4 
  IIC 0 0 0.00 5 0 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 2 0 
1972 DME 71 3,38 1.12 21 13 
  NEC 34 4,25 1.58 8 4 
  IIC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 2 0 
1976 DME 64 2,67 1.26 24 13 
  NEC 47 5,22 1.97 9 3 
  IIC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 0 0 
1980 DME 67 2,91 1.24 23 14 
  NEC 47 5,22 1.88 9 4 
  IIC 1 0,25 2.00 4 1 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 1 0 
1984 DME 61 2,26 1.54 27 13 
  NEC 55 5 1.96 11 3 
 14 
  IIC 1 0,17 2.41 6 1 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
1988 DME 78 2,44 1.56 32 13 
  NEC 57 5,18 2.10 11 3 
  IIC 3 0,3 3.17 10 1 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 4 0 
1992 DME 141 4,41 1.58 32 16 
  NEC 26 1,86 3.30 14 2 
  IIC 3 0,25 3.48 12 1 
  LDC 1 0,2 2.25 5 1 
1994 DME 149 4,52 1.58 33 16 
  NEC 23 1,44 3.99 16 1 
  IIC 10 1,67 0.76 12 4 
  LDC 1 0,83 0.49 6 1 
1998 DME 170 5,15 1.50 33 17 
  NEC 21 1,4 3.33 15 2 
  IIC 14 0,67 3.03 16 5 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 8 0 
2002 DME 197 5,97 1.64 33 16 
  NEC 25 1,47 2.22 17 5 
  IIC 12 0,67 2.94 18 3 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 9 0 
2006 DME 201 5,74 1.54 35 15 
  NEC 36 2,4 2.33 15 7 
  IIC 15 0,83 3.13 18 4 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 12 0 
2010 DME 207 6,09 1.60 34 16 
  NEC 36 2,4 1,70 15 7 
  IIC 15 0,75 3.35 20 3 
  LDC 0 0 0.00 13 0 
: standard deviation;    M: number of medals per country 
 
Although, at first sight, the political regime seems to be less relevant as a variable that 
differentiates among the Winter Games‟ medal winners, we have kept it in the model with 
some slight emendation compared to the Summer Olympics model. The reference country 
group remains CAPME for capitalist market economies; CEECs are those post-communist 
economies which have joined the EU in either 2004 or 2007; and we have gathered all the 
remaining post-communist economies in an EXCOM country group even though it would be 
sensible to consider Cuba and North Korea as still communist regimes (but their performance 
at Winter Games is negligible or nil).  
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It seems that a political regime variable might be a significant determinant (to be tested) of 
medal distribution per nation at Winter Olympics as well (Table 5). Being a centrally planned 
economy with some sort of communist regime was an advantage to win Winter Olympics 
medals until 1988 (and from 1972 to 1988 for CEECs). The average number of medal wins 
was higher in the EXCOM group than in the CEEC group and the latter higher than in the 
CAPME reference group during this span of time, even though medals were concentrated on a 
small number of communist countries, namely the former USSR. The collapse of the 
communist regime has had a seemingly significant impact on the number of medal wins 
which dramatically dropped in CEECs after 1990; it dropped much less significantly in other 
former communist countries, namely in the former USSR, and recovered as soon as 1994 
while the recovery in medal wins happened only in 2010 in CEECs. Such difference in 
momentum is probably due to harsher shock of economic transition, deeper and swifter 
transformation of the state-run sport system into a market sport economy in CEECs as 
compared with other post-communist countries, including Russia (Poupaux & Andreff, 2007).  
 
Table 5 - Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by political regime  
       
Year Country Number of Mean: m Coefficient of Number of  Countries  
  group medals   variation: /m countries with M > 0 
1964 CAPME 77 2,85 1.53 27 12 
  CEEC 1 0,2 2.25 5 1 
  EXCOM 25 6,25 2.00 4 1 
1968 CAPME 83 2,96 1.43 28 11 
  CEEC 10 1,67 1.35 6 3 
  EXCOM 13 4,33 1.73 3 1 
1972 CAPME 71 2,84 1.29 25 13 
  CEEC 18 3 1.84 6 3 
  EXCOM 16 4 2.00 4 1 
1976 CAPME 64 2,21 1.45 29 13 
  CEEC 20 3,33 2.31 6 2 
  EXCOM 27 13,5 1.41 2 1 
1980 CAPME 67 2,48 1.41 27 14 
  CEEC 26 4,33 2.12 6 4 
  EXCOM 22 5,5 2.00 4 1 
1984 CAPME 61 1,65 1.90 37 13 
  CEEC 30 5 1.92 6 2 
  EXCOM 26 5,2 2.13 5 2 
1988 CAPME 78 1,7 1.98 46 13 
  CEEC 28 4,67 2.15 6 2 
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  EXCOM 32 6,4 1.98 5 2 
1992 CAPME 141 2,88 2.08 49 16 
  CEEC 3 0,38 2.79 8 1 
  EXCOM 27 4,5 2.03 6 3 
1994 CAPME 146 3,32 1.96 44 15 
  CEEC 3 0,3 3.17 10 1 
  EXCOM 34 2,62 2.38 13 6 
1998 CAPME 170 3,78 1.84 45 17 
  CEEC 4 0,4 2.43 10 2 
  EXCOM 31 1,82 2.53 17 5 
2002 CAPME 196 3,92 2.15 50 15 
  CEEC 12 1,2 1.17 10 5 
  EXCOM 26 1,53 2.37 17 4 
2006 CAPME 201 3,94 1.97 51 15 
  CEEC 12 1,2 1.17 10 6 
  EXCOM 39 2,05 2.67 19 5 
2010 CAPME 204 3,92 2.14 52 15 
  CEEC 21 2,1 1.13 10 6 
  EXCOM 33 1,65 2.45 20 5 
: standard deviation;    M: number of medals per country 
 
With regards to the Regions dummy variable supposed to capture differences in sporting 
culture, we do not expect that it must be as much significant for Winter Olympics as it has 
been tested for Summer Olympics. The reason is very simple: all those countries which 
participate to Winter Games have in common a sporting culture geared towards the practice of 
winter sports wherever they are located and whatever their overall sporting culture. This is 
confirmed by the fact that, contrary to Summer Olympics, many countries in the world do not 
participate to Winter Olympics. Thus, we skip the regional dummy out of the Winter 
Olympics model.  
Now if a country would like to develop a wide range of winter sports on its territory, making 
it able to train and select performing athletes, it could not significantly achieve it without 
some proper weather conditions, in particular enough snow coverage per year, and more than 
a minimal endowment in winter sports resorts and facilities
11
. This leads us to introduce two 
new variables in the model. The first one Snow is a dummy variable differentiating countries 
with regards to their average degree of annual snow coverage. Indeed, among those countries 
which have participated at least once to Winter Olympics, the degree of snow coverage is 
quite variable, but it was not easy to get a precise measure of snow coverage back to 1964. 
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 Thus we neglect some exceptions as Dubai with its ski resort in a country without any natural snow coverage 
and without even a second winter sports facility in the country.  
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Thus we have gathered information provided by Maps of the World and the World 
Meteorological Organisation regarding the main climates, precipitations and temperature in 
order to build up the Snow dummy. The outcome in our sample of participating countries
12
 is 
as follows: 
POL (a so-called “polar” coverage for countries with a long duration of annual snow 
coverage): Belarus, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Norway, Russia (by extension CIS and the former USSR), Sweden = 12 countries; 
HIGH (local high winter snow coverage in otherwise temperate climate countries): Austria, 
Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic (by extension former Czechoslovakia), Denmark, France, 
Germany (by extension former GDR), Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, USA (and by extension former Yugoslavia) = 17 countries; 
MIDDLE (local middle snow coverage in temperate climate countries): Albania, American 
Samoa, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, China (including Hong Kong), Cyprus, Fiji, Georgia, Great Britain, Greece, Guam, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, North Korea, Portugal, Peru, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Swaziland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay = 39 countries; 
LOW (countries with no or low snow coverage): Algeria, Bermuda, Brazil, Cameroon, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands Antilles, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Virgin Islands = 
27 countries. 
 
Table 6 – Uneven medal distribution at Winter Olympics by 
level of snow coverage   
       
Year Country Number of Mean: m Coefficient of Number of  Countries  
  group medals   variation: s/m countries with M > 0 
1964 POL 60 8.57 1.06 7 5 
  HIGH 39 2.79 1,47 14 6 
  MIDDLE 4 0.31 2.03 13 3 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 2 0 
1968 POL 43 6.14 0.94 7 5 
  HIGH 53 3.53 1.08 15 8 
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 Some countries which have participated to Winter Olympics are excluded from our ample since data about 
population and GDP cannot be traced back to 1964. They are: Andorra, Caiman Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Porto Rico, and San Marino. No big medal winner. 
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  MIDDLE 10 0.83 3.12 12 2 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 3 0 
1972 POL 38 6.33 1.00 6 5 
  HIGH 58 4.46 0.93 13 11 
  MIDDLE 9 0.64 3.77 14 1 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 2 0 
1976 POL 46 6.57 1.44 7 5 
  HIGH 58 4.14 1.35 14 9 
  MIDDLE 7 0.47 3.30 15 2 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 1 0 
1980 POL 47 5.88 1.30 8 5 
  HIGH 61 4.69 1.39 13 10 
  MIDDLE 7 0.50 2.18 14 4 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 2 0 
1984 POL 59 7.38 1.17 8 5 
  HIGH 57 4.07 1.53 14 11 
  MIDDLE 1 0.05 4.60 19 1 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 7 0 
1988 POL 52 6.50 1.47 8 5 
  HIGH 79 5.27 1.32 15 11 
  MIDDLE 7 0.33 4.64 21 1 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 13 0 
1992 POL 61 5.55 1.51 11 5 
  HIGH 95 6.33 1.32 15 9 
  MIDDLE 15 0.68 1.94 22 6 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 15 0 
1994 POL 73 6.08 1.55 12 6 
  HIGH 88 5.18 1.46 17 8 
  MIDDLE 18 0.72 2.14 25 6 
  LOW 4 0.31 2.74 13 2 
1998 POL 75 6.25 1.42 12 6 
  HIGH 98 5.44 1.47 18 9 
  MIDDLE 30 1.03 2.56 29 8 
  LOW 2 0.15 3.67 13 1 
2002 POL 73 5.62 1.44 13 7 
  HIGH 134 7.05 1.58 19 11 
  MIDDLE 27 0.96 2.33 28 6 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 17 0 
2006 POL 93 7.15 1.30 13 8 
  HIGH 122 6.78 1.43 18 11 
  MIDDLE 37 1.12 2.70 33 7 
  LOW 0 0.00 0.00 16 0 
2010 POL 86 6.62 1.39 13 8 
  HIGH 134 7.05 1.47 19 12 
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  MIDDLE 37 1.12 2.95 33 5 
  LOW 1 0.59 0.41 17 1 
: standard deviation;    M: number of medals per country 
 
The distribution of medal wins across these four country groups from the 1964 to 2010 Winter 
Olympics (Table 6) suggests that snow coverage might well be a significant determinant of 
medal wins in winter sports. Countries with high snow coverage followed by countries with 
polar-like climate and snow coverage concentrate the great bulk of medal wins at Winter 
Olympics. The number of countries with high snow coverage increased from 14 in 1964 up to 
19 in 2010 while their number of medals won grew from 39 to 134. During the same span of 
time, the number of countries with polar-like snow coverage augmented from 7 in 1964 to 13 
in 2010 whereas their number of medal wins increased from 60 to 86. On the other hand, 13 
countries with middle snow coverage had won only 4 medals in 1964; they were 33 
participating at the 2010 Games where they won 37 medals. With regards to countries with 
low (or no) snow coverage, the marked increase in their participation (from 2 to 17) did not 
translate into an impressive growth in medal wins (from 0 to 1 – with once 4 medals won in 
1994 and once 2 medals in 2002). Snow coverage seems to be a differentiating factor among 
countries participating to Winter Olympics. 
A second new variable is introduced in the model to capture each country‟s endowment with 
winter sports resorts and facilities. Here we have relied on data available on various web sites 
describing ski resorts in different countries in the world, namely www.skiinfo.fr, www.sports-
hiver.com, www.neigeski.com, www.levoyageur.net/stations, www.fr.snow-forecast.com, 
www.french-china.org. A RESORT dummy variable has been designed on the basis of such 
information, considering a country as being endowed with many ski resorts and winter sports 
facilities when it has over 60 of them at its disposal. A country with a number of skiing resorts 
between 5 and 60 is considered as having an average endowment by world standard. A 
country with a number of ski resorts and winter sports facilities below 5 is assessed and 
ranked as having few opportunities to win medals due to her short availability of resorts-
facilities. The three country groups are comprised of: 
MANY winter sports resorts: Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany (GDR), 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia (CIS, USSR), Sweden, Switzerland, USA = 12 countries; 
BETWEEN many and few winter sports resorts: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
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Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine (Yugoslavia) = 
21 countries; 
FEW/NO winter sports resorts: Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ethiopia, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Great Britain, Ghana, Greece, 
Guam, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Portugal, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Taiwan, Tajikistan, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Virgin Islands = 62 countries.  
 
Table 7 – Medal distribution and winter sports resorts and winter sports facilities 
Year Country Number of Mean: m Coefficient of Number of  Countries  
  group medals   variation: s/m countries with M > 0 
1964 MANY 89 7.42 0.97 12 10 
  BETWEEN 13 0.87 2.98 15 3 
  FEW / NO 1 0.11 3.00 9 1 
1968 MANY 91 7.00 0.57 13 12 
  BETWEEN 15 1.00 2.56 15 3 
  FEW / NO 0 0.00 0.00 9 0 
1972 MANY 89 6.85 0.69 13 13 
  BETWEEN 16 1.14 2.31 14 4 
  FEW / NO 0 0.00 0.00 8 0 
1976 MANY 95 6.79 1.15 14 12 
  BETWEEN 15 0.94 2.38 16 3 
  FEW / NO 1 0.14 2.71 7 1 
1980 MANY 95 6.79 1.11 14 13 
  BETWEEN 18 1.28 2.06 14 4 
  FEW / NO 2 0.22 2.00 9 2 
1984 MANY 100 7.14 1.10 14 13 
  BETWEEN 16 1.00 3.25 16 3 
  FEW / NO 1 0.56 0.43 18 1 
1988 MANY 120 8.57 1.02 14 13 
  BETWEEN 18 1.13 2.14 16 4 
  FEW / NO 0 0.00 0.00 27 0 
1992 MANY 148 11.38 0.76 13 12 
  BETWEEN 20 1.18 1.75 17 6 
  FEW / NO 3 0.09 4.22 33 2 
1994 MANY 150 12.5 0.71 12 11 
  BETWEEN 25 1.25 1.64 20 7 
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  FEW / NO 8 0.23 3.00 35 4 
1998 MANY 155 12.92 0.66 12 11 
  BETWEEN 44 2.00 1.86 22 9 
  FEW / NO 6 0.16 3.06 38 4 
2002 MANY 186 15.5 0.73 12 11 
  BETWEEN 42 1.83 1.47 23 10 
  FEW / NO 6 0.14 4.07 42 3 
2006 MANY 191 15.92 0.59 12 11 
  BETWEEN 55 2.50 1.52 22 11 
  FEW / NO 6 0.13 3.85 46 4 
2010 MANY 188 15.67 0.72 12 11 
  BETWEEN 62 2.82 1.43 22 10 
  FEW / NO 8 0.17 3.29 48 5 
: standard deviation;    M: number of medals per country 
 
Countries with a good endowment in ski resorts and winter sports facilities are winning an 
increasing number of Olympic medals from 89 in 1964 to 188 in 2010 (even 191 in 2006) 
while their number has always stood between 12 and 14 (Table 7). The number of 
participating countries with few or no resorts-facilities has grown from 9 in 1964 to 48 in 
2010 whereas their number of medal wins has increased from 1 to 8. The number of countries 
with an average endowment stands in between as to their medal wins. It seems that a shortage 
of ski resorts and winter sports facilities is a hindrance to win medals at Winter Olympics 
whereas medal wins benefit to well-endowed countries.  
Thus, the model is adapted to estimating the determinants of medal wins at Winter Olympics 
as follows:  
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and N is the population of a nation, Y/N is its GDP per inhabitant, both variables being four-
year lagged for the same reason as with Summer Olympics, Host is a dummy variable 
identifying the country that hosts the Games, Political Regime is a dummy variable which 
captures the impact of the political regime on medal wins, Snow is a dummy variable 
differentiating countries with regards to their degree of annual snow coverage, and Resort is a 
 22 
dummy capturing the significance of ski resorts and winter sports facilities located in a 
country.  
 
5. Economic determinants of medal win at Winter Olympic Games 
 
Model (4) is now used for estimating whether the above-listed variables are significant 
determinants of medal wins at Winter Olympics. Econometric testing covers all Winter 
Olympics from 1964 up to 2010. Data for population and GDP per inhabitant are taken from 
CHELEM data base (which retrieves and proceeds to consistency checks between World 
Bank and OECD data). A first specification M1 resorts to a left-hand censored Tobit model 
since a non negligible number of countries that participate to Winter Olympics do not win any 
medal. Therefore, a zero value of the Mi,t dependent variable does not mean that a country has 
not participated and we work out a simple Tobit, not a Tobit 2 (with a two stage Heckman 
procedure). This first specification takes on board five explanatory variables: population, 
GDP per inhabitant, the three dummies Host, Snow and Resort. The MIDDLE country group 
which contains the biggest number of countries is taken as the reference for the Snow dummy. 
With the same rationale, the most numerous FEW/NO country group is taken as the reference 
for the Resort dummy. In a second specification M2, the censored Tobit model includes in 
addition the Political Regime dummy variable. A third specification M3 is the one which will 
be used later on for prediction and it encompasses one more explanatory variable, i.e. the 
inertial variable Mi,t-4.  
 
Table 8 - Tobit estimations of medals won at Winter Olympics  
    
Independent variables Tobit model M1 Tobit model M2 Tobit model M3 
Log population (t-4) 2.006 *** 1.873 *** 0.787 *** 
Log GDP per inhabitant (t-4) 3.732 *** 6.958 *** 2.813 *** 
Host 2.732 3.245 * 3.874 *** 
Resort (ref. FEW/NO)      
          MANY 13.596 *** 15.633 *** 5.904 *** 
          BETWEEN 5.889 *** 6.951 *** 2.989 *** 
Snow (ref. MIDDLE)      
          POLAR 8.042 *** 5.390 *** 2.092 ** 
          HIGH 0.922 -1.292 -0.286 
          LOW -1.906 -0.313 -0.653 
Political regime (ref. CAPME)      
          CEEC   6.302 *** 3.186 *** 
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          EXCOM   10.077 *** 3.839 *** 
Medals (t-4)    0.828 *** 
Constant -24.198 *** -34.252 *** -15.733 
Number of observations 663 663 662 
Log-likelihood value -957.881 -928.749 -811.892 
Pseudo-R2 0.221 0.245 0.339 
*** Significant at a 1% threshold; ** at 5%; * at 10%.  
 
In all three specifications (Table 8), GDP per inhabitant and population are very significant 
determinants of medal wins at Winter Olympics with a positive sign. Medals are basically 
shared across developed economies with rather important population. More interesting is that 
the endowment in ski and winter sports resorts is also a very significant determinant of medal 
wins. Belonging to the BETWEEN country group significantly increases a nation‟s 
probability to win medals at Winter Olympics and it is even more so for those countries with 
many winter sports resorts. The very existence of winter sports resorts reflects a high capacity 
of having a winter sports practice in a country and, consequently, selecting experienced 
athletes in the national squad.  
Snow coverage surprisingly does not appear as a significant determinant of Winter Olympics 
medal wins. Compared with MIDDLE coverage country group, polar-like countries have a 
significant probability to win more medals, but this probability is not significant for high 
snow coverage countries; the probability to win fewer medals is not significant for low snow 
coverage countries. The same result shows up with the other two specifications M2 and M3. 
Indeed, some countries with high snow coverage do not perform that well at Winter Olympic 
Games such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is not enough for a country to have snow, if it 
does not have enough ski resorts and winter sports facilities to train potential medal winners at 
Winter Games.  
Introducing a Political regime dummy in our second specification improves the estimation 
overall (Pseudo-R2 increases). The host country dummy becomes significant (though at 10%). 
Being a Central and Eastern European post-communist nation increases its probability to win 
medals at Winter Olympics and it is even more so for the EXCOM country group (CIS 
countries and all other non Soviet former communist countries).  
The third specification M3 is by far the best one with a marked improvement of the Pseudo-
R2. Moreover all explanatory variables are significant except snow coverage with regards to 
high and low snow coverage countries. The inertial variable – medal wins at previous Winter 
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Olympics – is significant as well and the host country dummy becomes significant at 1%13. 
This model fits well for predicting medal wins at the Sochi Winter Games.  
 
6. Economic prediction of medal wins at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics 
 
Our prediction exercise based on model M3 takes CHELEM preliminary data for 2010 as 
regards to population and GDP per inhabitant and then calculates the Sochi outcome in terms 
of medal wins (Table 9). The expected winner (first ranked country) is the U.S. with 36 medal 
wins, just like it has been in Vancouver 2010 with 37 medals. Germany ranks second with 28 
medal wins while she has ranked first in 2006 (29 medals), 2002 (36 medals), 1998 (29 
medals), 1992 (26 medals), and second in 2010 (30 medals). Canada takes over the third rank 
with 27 medals like in Vancouver 2010 (26 medals) and Turin 2006 (24 medals). France is 
expected to win 12 medals in Sochi (8
th
 rank) as against 11 in Vancouver, 9 in Turin, 11 in 
Salt Lake City, 8 in Nagano, 5 in Lillehammer, 9 in Albertville 1992 and ... 9 in Grenoble 
1968 (with a strong host country effect).  
 
Table 9 - Prediction of medal wins at Sochi Winter Olympics  
     
Countries Medals won Medal wins Lower bound Upper bound 
  in 2010 predicted in 2014     
USA 37 36 33 38 
Germany 30 28 26 30 
Canada 26 27 25 28 
Russia 15 24 21 27 
Norway 23 24 22 25 
Austria 16 15 14 16 
Sweden 11 13 12 14 
France 11 12 11 13 
China 11 11 9 13 
South Korea 14 11 10 13 
Switzerland 9 9 8 10 
Japan 5 7 6 9 
Italy 5 7 6 8 
Netherlands 8 6 5 7 
Poland 6 6 4 8 
Czech Republic 6 6 4 7 
                                                 
13
 We have also tested a fourth specification including the Regions dummy variable used in the Summer 
Olympics model. For three regions the test does not provide any result since these regions have never won a 
medal at Winter Games. For most other regions, the variable is not significant even at a 10% threshold. 
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Finland 5 5 3 6 
Australia 3 3 1 4 
Slovenia 3 2 1 4 
Croatia 3 2 0 4 
Slovakia 3 2 0 3 
Belarus 3 1 0 3 
 
Winning 24 medals, Russia would rank fourth at Sochi Games. It is not enough to host Winter 
Games to be the winner. However, it would be a quite better performance than the disastrous 
15 medals won in Vancouver (6
th
 rank behind Norway and Austria) and 13 medals in Salt 
Lake City (6
th
 rank). Sochi Olympics might materialise the end of the deep transformation of 
the Russian sports system undertaken during the 1990s and 2000s. This would be a sign of 
Russian recovery as a Winter Olympics sporting power but without coming back to the 1976-
1988 “golden age” when the Soviet squad usually was winning between one fifth and one 
quarter of all distributed medals. Economic (and sporting system‟s) transformation was a 
shock on Russian and CIS medal wins, whose share fell below 10% of medals total since 
2002. In particular, the transformational recession (Kornaï, 1994) has seriously affected 
Russia‟s GDP per capita downwards until 1998; the same roughly applies to other CIS 
countries. In our model, a decreasing GDP per capita explains a lower number of medal wins. 
A decreasing number of medals for Russia is (only partly) compensated by the emergence of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as more or less regular medal winners at Winter Games 
since 1994 (Table 10). However the confidence interval for Russian medal wins is between 21 
and 27 (Table 9). So that, in the worst case, Russia may win less medals in 2014 than at the 
1994 and 2006 Winter Games, which would not seem to be very rewarding as considered by 
Russian sports authorities. Moreover, our model predicts no medal win for Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine in Sochi 2014 and only one for Belarus.  
 
Table 10 - Medal wins by (post)-communist countries, 1964-2010      
              
Country 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
CEECs               
Bulgaria     1     1 3 1   
Czech Republic          3 3 4 6 
Estonia           3 3 1 
Hungary     1          
Latvia            1 2 
Poland   1        2 2 6 
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Romania  1             
Slovakia            1 3 
Slovenia         3  1  3 
former Czechoslovakia 1 4 3 1 1 6 3 3       
former GDR  5 14 19 23 24 25        
former Yugoslavia      1 3        
CEECs/medias total % 1.0 9.4 17.1 18.0 22.7 26.5 22.5 1.7 1.6 1.9 5.4 4.8 8.1 
CIS countries               
Belarus         2 2 1 1 3 
Kazakhstan         3 2   1 
Russia         23 18 13 22 15 
Ukraine         2 1  2   
Uzbekistan         1      
former USSR 25 13 16 27 22 25 29 23*       
CIS/medals total (%) 24.3 12.3 15.2 24.3 19.1 21.4 21.0 13.4 16.9 11.2 6.0 9.9 7.4 
Other EXCOM               
China        3 3 8 8 11 11 
Croatia           4 3 3 
North Korea               1           
* CIS unified squad              
 
With regards to CEECs, the transition economic shock was slightly milder than in CIS 
countries and transformational recession lasted shorter. Nevertheless, transition has triggered 
a dramatic drop in CEEC medal wins at Winter Games which fell down to 3 Czechoslovak 
medals in 1992, 3 Slovene medals in 1994, 1 Bulgarian and 3 Czech medals in 1998. The 
recovery in medal wins has been quite slower than economic recovery since the sports sector 
was not a top priority in the transition strategy backed by Washington organisations (IMF and 
the World Bank). Moreover medal wins are scattered across eight CEECs since 2002, except 
Hungary and Lithuania. The most spectacular shock on medal wins in CEECs derives from 
German unification in 1990. The former GDR also enjoyed a sort of “golden age” from 1972 
to 1988 with between 14 and 25 medal wins at Winter Olympics
14
. At the 1992 Winter 
Games, the unified German squad, taking stake of East German athletes, outperformed (with 
26 medals) all other participating countries including the CIS unified squad (23 medals). 
Since then Germany has become the top performer at Winter Olympics with the biggest 
number of medals won from Albertville 1992 to Vancouver 2010 (except Lillehammer 1994, 
2
nd
 rank behind Norway).  
                                                 
14
 We do not come back here to specific determinants of Olympics performances reached by the communist 
GDR, see Andreff et al. (2008) and Dryden (2006).  
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In Sochi 2014, our model forecasts only 16 medal wins for CEECs taken altogether, which 
would be a step back compared to the 2010 recovery with 21 medals though better than 12 
medal wins in 2002 and 2006. This would merely benefit to the Czech and Polish squads, 6 
medals each, then to Slovenia and Slovakia (2 medals each). Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria, 
which had been able to win medals in the four previous Games, are not expected to win any of 
them at Sochi Winter Olympics.  
A final note about other post-communist countries must underline the rise of China as a new 
Winter Olympics winner (ranked 11
th
 in 1998, 10
th
 in 2002, 9
th
 in 2006 and 8
th
 in 2010), even 
though this cannot compare with this nation‟s outstanding performance at the Summer Games 
hosted in Beijing. Thus, it is not surprising that our model predicts again 11 medal wins for 
China in 2014 (9
th
 rank) but note that the upper bound of the interval confidence for China is 
13 medals. If the Chinese squad performs very well, it may even pretend to the 7
th
 rank in 
terms of medal wins at Sochi Games. Croatia did extremely well – given the size (population, 
GDP) of this country – since the 2002 Winter Games. The model forecasts 2 Croatian medals 
in Sochi, with an upper bound at 4 medals, like at the 2002 Winter Olympics. 
 
7. Conclusion: Economic prediction and surprising sport outcomes 
 
All the above predictions must be taken with a pinch of salt.  This is namely due to a number 
of surprising sporting outcomes. Indeed, there are many unexpected sporting outcomes 
observed ex post – i.e. achieved outcomes markedly different from the forecast – even though 
it happens more with the FIFA World Cup than Summer Olympics (M. & W. Andreff, 2010). 
Unexpected or surprising outcomes of a sport contest have not really been analysed so far. 
This happens when opponents in a sport contest have clearly uneven sporting forces, and the 
underdog wins the favourite. Elaborating on a metrics to quantify surprising sporting 
outcomes should be a promising avenue for further research. It will be possible to check after 
Sochi 2014 whether Winter Olympics are characterised with many or few surprising sport 
outcomes. 
With regards to the host country, Russia is not likely to win the biggest number of medals at 
Sochi Winter Games. If she makes it with more than 27 medals one would be allowed to 
conclude that she performed very well, better than expected with an economic model, and that 
this must be due to exceptional efforts of Russian athletes and coaches before and during 
Sochi Games. If Russia would win less than 21 medals, you could join Prime Minister 
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Medvedev and President Putin in complaining that the Russian winter sports squad should 
really have done better – or that it was unexpectedly bad lucky. 
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